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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.
PAUL SORENSON,

Case No. 20030496-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from two convictions for attempted exploitation of a minor, both
third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3 (2003). This Court has
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Is defendant entitled to reversal of his conditional guilty pleas where he fails to
attack the trial court's primary ground for denying his motion to suppress the child
pornography found on his computer?
Since defendant does not challenge the basis of the court's ruling below, no
standard of review applies.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This appeal does not depend on the interpretation of any constitutional provision,
statute, or rule.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Amended Information dated 18 March 2003 with two
counts of attempted exploitation of a minor, both third degree felonies, in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5a-3 (2003). R197-196.1

Defendant's motion to suppress child pornography seized from his computer and
disks was denied in two written rulings on 4 September 2002, see R139-135, and 20 April
2003, 5eeR210-208.
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to both counts, reserving the right to
challenge the trial court's ruling. R195-188. The trial court imposed the statutory term of
0-5 years for each count, which it then suspended and placed defendant a thirty-six month
term of probation. R222-219. Defendant timely appealed. R224.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties stipulated to the following facts, drafted by defense counsel:
On April 18, 2001, officers went to the home of the defendant.
Officers approached the defendant at his home. Officers advised [sic]
asked to look at a computer at the defendant's home. The officers then
look[ed] at the computer via a program call[ed] wpre-search[.]' [T]he
officers searched the computer locating what they believed to be 40 images
of child pornography. They then terminated their search and seized the
computer.
The officers then applied for a search warrant by filing an affidavit
in support of the warrant. See attachment. The affidavit was signed on 24,
2001. Based on said affidavit, Judge E\re of the Fourth District Court
signed the search warrant on April 24, 2001. See Search Warrant.

'The record on appeal has been numbered in reverse chronological order.
2

On May 7, 2001, the officers executed the search warrant. On said
date, the Forensic Computer Lab received the computer and two floppy
disks from the officer. A bit stream image backup was made of the original
drive. The backup was then transferred to recordable CDs and marked as
the original backup. The backup was used to create additional bit stream
image copies that were used in the forensic examination. This same process
was used on the floppy disks.
R68-67 (a copy the stipulation is contained in addendum A). The search warrant affidavit
by Detective Atack of the Salt Lake City Police Department was attached to the
stipulation and stated in pertinent part:
In January of 2000,1 received information from the Dallas Texas
Police Department that [defendant] of 234 South 800 West, Orem UT
84058, had purchased access to a web site that distributed child
pornography with one of his credit cards.
On April 18, 2001, myself and other members of the Utah Internet
Crimes Against Children Task Force contacted [defendant] at his residence.
We identified ourselves to [defendant] and explained to him that we had
received information that he had purchased access to child pornography on
the Internet. I informed him that he was not under arrest. I asked
[defendant] if we could look at his computer to see if he had any child
pornography stored on it. [Defendant] said "sure, no problem" and led us to
the computer. Using a program called "Pre-search" we conducted a consent
search of [defendant's]. During the search I saw approximately 40 images
of naked children that I believed to be under the age of 12 in various poses
exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual activity. After viewing these
images I terminated the consent search of [defendant's] computer. During
this consent search, [defendant] stated that the pictures we viewed on his
computer "seem familiar to one's he's seen over the years/' I seized the
computer so that a full forensic examination of it could be performed.
On the basis of the information contained in this affidavit, I believe
there is probable cause to believe that [defendant] may be a collector of
child pornography and that there will be additional evidence of this crime
stored on his computer that was seized. Accordingly, it is requested that
[the] following items be searched which are located at 257 East 200 South,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111:
3

A personal computer known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440,
serial number N160095844+.
Two floppy disks know[n] as Diane's 1.2 MB and Diane's
720 KB.
R63-62, add. A.
Defendant moved to suppress the child pornography found on his computer and
disks, alleging that they were confiscated without his consent, exigent circumstances, or a
warrant. R45-43 (a copy is attached in addendum B). The State responded that the
search and seizure of defendant's computer and disks was justified by defendant's
voluntary consent. R56-54 (a copy is contained in addendum C). The State further
argued that seizure of the computer was additionally justified by probable cause and
exigent circumstances, and that the continuation of the search at the forensic lab was
additionally justified by the search warrant. R53-52, add. C.
Thereafter, defendant filed a second motion to suppress asserting that the search
warrant was not timely executed under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-205 (2003) (wThe
search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of issuance. Any search
warrant not executed within in this time shall be void and shall be returned to the court or
magistrate as not executed"). R130-128, add. B.
The State reiterated that the search of defendant's computer and disks—both at his
home and at the forensic lab—was justified by defendant's voluntary consent which had
never been withdrawn. R147, add. C. Additionally, the State posited that because police
possessed defendant's computer pursuant to his consent before they obtained the search
4

warrant it was not necessary to serve defendant with the warrant. R146, add. C. Rather,
the search warrant was properly and essentially "served" on law enforcement the same
day it was obtained (24 April 2001) because law enforcement, or the forensic lab, then
possessed the computer. Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-206 (2003) ("When the
officer seizes property pursuant to a search warrant, he shall give a receipt to the person
from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was found. If no person is present, the
officer shall leave the receipt in the place where he found the property. Failure to give or
leave a receipt shall not render the evidence seized inadmissible at trial").
Even if the warrant was not deemed served until 7 May 2001, the date it was given
to the forensic lab, the State argued that it was still timely served within the 10-day limit
set forth in section 77-23-205(2). R145, add. C. Under rule 2, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays are excluded when computing time
periods less than eleven days. Id. Thus, excluding weekends, the warrant was served
nine days after it was issued and was therefore valid. Id.
Finally, the State argued that police acted in good faith in executing the search
warrant and that the probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant had not
become stale. R145-144, add C. Indeed, the seized computer was kept in a "protected
environment and was not going to change no matter how long it took for the search.'*
R144, add. C. Accordingly, even if there was an arguable technical violation of section
77-23-205(2), defendant suffered no prejudice and suppression was unwarranted. Id.

5

The trial court denied defendant's motions to suppress in a written mling filed on 4
September 2002:
. . . The Court is persuaded by [the State's] pleading and authorities
regarding consensual searches and that such a search is valid if the consent
was freely and voluntarily given. After review of the parties' pleading and
authorities the Court concludes that [defendant freely and voluntarily gave
his permission for the officers to search his computer. Further, no evidence
has been established of record to show that [defendant later withdrew his
consent to render a continued search invalid. . . .
The officers seized the computer on April 18, 2001, taking it into
their custody but the warrant was not obtained by the officers until April 24,
2001. The warrant was essentially served on [April] 24, 2001 at the time
the officers obtained the warrant because the property covered by the
warrant was in their possession. Therefore, the warrant was served on April
24, 2001 and not executed until May 7, 2001 when the computer and disks
were delivered to the forensic lab for search. After review of the statutory
authorities the Court finds that there is no requirement in [section] 77-23205 that requires the authorities who are executing the search upon the
property to conduct such search within a specific time period. The Court
concludes that the subsequent forensic search conducted upon the computer
following it's seizure was a valid search authorized by warrant obtained on
April 24, 2001.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully denies [defendant's
Motion to Suppress.
R139-136 (a complete copy of the ruling is attached in addendum D).
Defendant filed a written Objection to Finding of Fact Referencing Search by
Consent on 17 March 2003, which stated:
Defendant objects to any findings suggesting the State had the
defendant's consent to search his computer or property. The facts in
support of the motion to suppress were contained within the "Stipulated
Facts referencing Motion to Suppress."
No facts were presented to the Court regarding the issue of consent.
6

R182 (a copy is attached in addendum E). Defendant asserted that "all the facts relevant
to the [m]otion to [s]uppress were contained in the parties' stipulation and the search
warrant affidavit which he attached to his objection. See R182, 180-174, add. E.
Defendant also filed a Motion to Strike Court Findings Not Substantiated by Stipulation
re: Facts on 2 April 2003. R199-198 (a copy is attached as addendum F). Defendant
argued that the trial court's ruling ''went beyond the facts represented in the stipulation,"
and that the "only factual basis for the Court's ruling (re: motion to suppress) would be
within the parties' stipulation. No other hearings were conducted regarding the motion to
suppress and no other evidence exists." Id. The State responded that the trial court's
voluntary consent ruling was supported by the express language of the parties' stipulation
which had been drafted by defense counsel. R202-201. The State also pointed out that
there was no indication in the parties' stipulation that police claimed authority to search
defendant's computer or disks, exhibited force, used deception or trickery, or that
defendant objected or otherwise refused to cooperate. R205-204 (citing State v Bisner,
2001 UT99,<[47, 37P.3dl073).
The trial court denied defendant's motion to strike in a written ruling filed on 29
April 2003. R210-208 (a copy is attached in addendum F). The trial court found that the
parties' stipulation,
as drafted by [defendant's counsel,. . incorporated' the facts also
contained within the attachments as well[,] i.e., the Search Warrant and the
Affidavit for the Search Warrant, as opposed to mere reference to the fact
that a search warrant was issued which required no such document

7

reference or incorporation. Notably, the Affidavit for Search Warrant
contains the following language:
On April 18, 2001, myself (Det. Atack and other members of
the Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force
contacted [defendant] at his residence. We identified
ourselves to [defendant] and explained to him that we had
received information that he had purchased access to child
pornography on the Internet. I informed him that he was not
under arrest. I asked [defendant] if we could look at his
computer to see if he had any child pornography stored on
it. [Defendant] said 'sure, no problem9 and led us to the
computer. Using a program called Tre-search' we
conducted a consent search of [defendant's] computer.
During the search I saw approximately 40 images of naked
children that I believed to be under the age of 12 in various
poses exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual activity.
After viewing these images I terminated the consent search of
[defendant's] computer. During this consent search,
[defendant] stated that the pictures we viewed on his
computer 'seemed familiar to ones he's seen over the years.'
I seized the computer so that a full forensic examination of it
could be performed.
These are the facts known and claimed by the parties at the time the
stipulation was made relative to the [m]otion to [s]uppress. It is the Court's
opinion as set forth in its previous [r]uling that notwithstanding
[defendant's assertions to the contrary, such factual occurrence and the
circumstances of this case support the conclusion that the search was a
consensual search. For these reasons and by reason of the authorities and
arguments set forth in [the State's] memoranda, [defendant's [m]otion is
respectfully denied.
R209-208, add. F (emphasis added).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court ruled that the search of defendant's computer and disks for child
pornography—both at his home and at the forensic lab—was based on defendant's
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voluntary consent. The trial court also found that the seizure of defendant's computer
was additionally justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that the
continuation of the search at the forensic lab was additionally justified by the properly
served search warrant. On appeal, defendant does not address the trial court's consent
ruling. Instead, defendant argues that the search warrant was not timely served within ten
days from the date of its issuance under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-305(2) (2003).
Because defendant does not attack the primary basis of the trial court's ruling, his claim
fails.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF HIS
CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS WHERE HE FAILS TO ATTACK
THE PRIMARY GROUND FOR DENYING HIS MOTION TO
SUPPRESS THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY FOUND ON HIS
COMPUTER
Defendant claims that the child pornography found on his computer and disks
should have been suppressed because the search warrant was allegedly not served within
10 days after it was issued, as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-205(2) (2003). Aplt.
Br. at 6-8. Defendant's argument overlooks that the trial court denied his motion to
suppress only after finding that the search and seizure of his computer and disks was
justified under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. See R139-135, add. D;
R210-208, add. F. Thus, the search warrant here provided no more than an alternative
ground for the trial court's ruling. Because defendant fails to attack the primary basis for
the trial court's ruling, his claim necessarily fails.
9

This is a consent search case. The trial court ruled that the search of defendant's
computer and disks for child pornography—including the initial search at defendant's
home and the continuation thereof at the forensic lab—was based on defendant's
voluntary consent. See R139-136, add. D; R210-208, add. F. Alternatively, the trial court
found that the seizure of defendant's computer and disks was additionally justified by
probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that the continuation of the search at the
forensic lab was additionally justified by the subsequently obtained search warrant. Id.
Defendant does not attack the trial court's consent ruling. His brief does not quote
the trial court's ruling, mention the consent exception to the warrant requirement, or
acknowledge that the trial court upheld the search and seizure of his computer and disks
in reliance upon the consent exception to the warrant requirement. See Aplt. Br. at 6-8.
Rather, defendant merely argues that a subsequently obtained search warrant for a further
search of the seized computer at the forensic lab was not executed within the "statutorily
mandated ten (10) days," and was therefore void. Aplt. Br. at 7.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the argument
portion of appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on."
As Utah courts have frequently reiterated, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in
10

which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v.
Gomez, 2002 UT 120,1j 20, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah
1988) (in turn quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981))).
Thus, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, the reviewing court will
"decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, f 12, 69 P.3d 1278 (rejecting
prosecutorial misconduct challenge). Similarly, u[w]hen a party fails to offer any
meaningful analysis, [the court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002
UT App 234,1[ 12, 52 P.3d 467. An appellant must, in addition to citing cases, "explain
why . . . the cited cases compel this court to reverse the district court. . ." Id.
"Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately brief arguments/' State v.
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966
(Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Yates. 834 P.2d
599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992)). See
also State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, % 28, 48 P.3d 872, cert, denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002);
State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,1f 13, 72 P.3d 138.
Because defendant fails to attack the basis for the trial court's consent ruling here,
his challenge is inadequately briefed. Although his brief contains one legal authority, it
does not explain why the single cited case compels this Court to reverse the trial court's
consent ruling. Indeed, it does not address or even mention this ground for the trial
court's ruling. Accordingly, this Court should decline to address defendant's challenge.
*

*

ii

*

Even if the Court were to address defendant's inadequately briefed claim, he
cannot prevail. Assuming the warrant was technically invalid under section 77-23205(2), the warrant only went to the continuation of the search at the forensic lab. See
R65-62, add. A. Defendant fails to argue, let alone to demonstrate that the arguably,
technically invalid warrant for the forensic lab search compels suppression of the 40 child
pornography images earlier observed by police on defendant's computer at his home
pursuant to his voluntary consent. Id. See State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 922-924
(Utah App. 1995) (finding admission of illegally seized evidence harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt where evidence was cumulative of properly admitted evidence). Further,
a technical statutory violation does not necessarily warrant suppression, particularly
where as here, defendant makes no claim that the alleged statutory violation amounted to
a constitutional deprivation or rendered probable cause to search stale. See State v. Ribe,
876 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah App. 1994) (recognizing that suppression of evidence 'is an
appropriate remedy for illegal police conduct only when that conduct implicates a
fundamental violation of a defendant's rights"). See also State v. Miller, 429 N.W.2d 26,
34-35 (S.D. 1988) (holding that South Dakota's "ten-day rule is not a matter of
constitutional dimensions, as neither the Fourth Amendment nor [the state constitution]
contain such a limit," and refusing to suppress even though the ten-day rule was broken
absent a showing of staleness).
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's third-degree felony convictions for attempted sexual exploitati
minor should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on j]_ February 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on ' T February 2004, a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
SHELDEN R. CARTER
3325 North University, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

FILED
Fourth Judicial 3i$tr>ci r.m,n
Of Utah County. State c > i >Mr

7/Zs/(?z~

I'M „,

SHELDEN R CARTER (0589)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-9801
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH
UTAH COUNTY
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,
Stipulated Facts Referencing
Motion to Suppress
vs.
PAUL SORENSON,
Crim. No. 011403460
Defendant.
-oooOooo —
On April 18, 2001, officers went to the home of the defendant. Officers
approached the defendant at his home. Officers advised asked to look at a
computer at the defendant's home. The officers then look at the computer via a
program call 'pre-search' the officers searched the computer locating what they
believed to be 40 images of child pornography. They then terminated their
search and seized the computer.

v

The officers then applied for a search warrant bv filing an affidavit in
support of the warrant See attachment
2001

The affidavit was signed on April 24,

Based on said affidavit, Judge Evre of the Fourth District Court signed the

search warrant on April 24, 2001 See Search Warrant
On Mav 7, 2001, the officers executed the search warrant On said date,
the Forensic Computer Lab received the computer and two floppy disks from the
officer

A bit stream image backup was made of the original hard drive The

backup was then transferred to recordable CDs and marked as the original
backup The backup was used to create additional bit stream image copies that
were used in the forensic examination This same process was used on the
floppy disks
Dated t h i s ^ / ^ a y of A r t i s t , 2002

raula Houston
For the Attorney General for the State of Utah
Dated this222day of August,

dant Sorenson
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally faxed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing on this «*9J£L day of August, 2002, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid to the following:
Hand delivered this day to the Attorney General

Fourth Judicial District Court
District Court
Provo, Utah
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
No.
To any peace officer in the State of Utah:
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Detective Ryan
Atack, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that on the premises known
as:
Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Office, 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake
City, UT, 84111.
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain
property or evidence described as:
A personal computer, known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number
N160095844 + .
Two floppy disks, known as Diane's 1.2MB and Diane's 720KB.
And that said property, which was seized by the Internet Crimes Against Children Task
Force, was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has been used to commit
or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
You are therefore commanded in the daytime, to make a search of the above described
items for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same or

>M1TJ*

any part thereof, to bring it before me at the Fourth District Court, County of Utah,
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

t
2&

day of April, 2001.

Judge
Fourth District Court

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
I, Detective Ryan Atack, under oath state
1
I am a Detective with the Salt Lake City police department I have been a police
officer for 9 years and am currently assigned to the Utah Internet Crimes Against Children
Task Force My current assignment is that of investigating the sexual exploitation of children
by means of the Internet I have attended the Fox Valley Technical College protecting children
on-line course I have also attended the Western States Vice Conference, the National
Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics On-line Investigation course, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation Innocent Images course I have investigated several cases involving
the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet
2
This affidavit is made in support of an application for a warrant to search a computer
which I have seized from Paul Sorensen The computer is a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial
number N160095844+ I seized the computer on Apnl 18, 2001 and it is being stored at the Utan
Internet Crimes against Children Task Force Office located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 This affidavit has been reviewed by Jason P Perry, Assistant Ulah Attorney
General
3
In January of 2000, I received information from the Dallas Texas Police
Department that Paul Sorensen of 234 South 800 Webt Orem, UT 84058, had purchased
access to a web site that distributed child pornographv with one of his credit cards
4
On April 18, 2001, myself and other members of the Utah Internet Crimes
Against Children Task Force contacted Paul Sorensen at his residence We identified
ourselves to Mr Sorensen and explained to him that we had received information that he had
purchased access to child pornography on the Internet I informed him that he was not under
arrest I asked Mr Sorensen if we could look at his computer to see if he had any child

pornography stored on it. Mr. Sorensen said "sure, no problem" and led us to the computer.
Using a program called "Pre-search" we conducted a consent search of Mr. Sorensen's
computer. During the search I saw approximately 40 images of naked children that I believed
to be under the age of 12 in various poses exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual
activity. After viewing these images I terminated the consent search of Mr. Sorensen's
computer. During this consent search, Mr. Sorensen stated that the pictures we viewed on his
computer u seem familiar to ones he's seen over the years". I seized the computer so that a full
forensic examination of it could be preformed.
6. On the basis of the information contained in this affidavit, I believe there is probable
cause to believe that Paul Sorensen may be a collector of child pornography and that there will
be additional evidence of this crime stored on his computer that was seized. Accordingly, it is
requested that following items be searched which are located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111:
A personal computer known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number
N160095844+.
Two Floppy disks know as Diane's 1.2 MB and Diane's 720 KB

'Elective Ryan
Ryan Atack
Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

t

Fourth District Court

/J-f

day of April, 2001.
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SHELDEN R CARTER (0589)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attornev for Defendant
3325 North University.. Suite 200
Pro\o. Utah 84604-4438
Telephone: 375-9801
IN THE FOURTH JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH. UTAH COUNTY
—ooOoo—
(MOTION TO SUPPRESS &
STATE OF UTAH.
) MEMORANDUM:
) PROBABLE CAUSE RE:
Plaintiff,
) SEARCH WARRANT
vs.
)

)
PAUL HARVEY SORENSEN.
Defendant.

)
)
)

TYi3!CN#_.
CASE NO. 011403460

)

—ooOoo—

Defendant herein seeks this Court to suppress evidence. Defendant asserts that
officers herein took, confiscated and search his property. The defendant asserts that such
was done without warrant and without consent to search the data contained within said
computer. The defendant asserts that the officers did so without a warrant when a warrant
was necessitated.
The defendant asserts that such conduct is a violation of the rights guaranteed to
him under Art. I Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.

.1

FACTS
The defendant is accused of \iolating the provisions of section 76-5a-3. The basis
of the accusation i> that the defendant had on a computer images of child pornography.
At the preliminarv hearing heard on Mav 30, 2002. the officer advised that thev went to
the defendant's home on April 18, 2001 and entered the home. The officer advised that
thev conducted a search of a computer in the defendant's home. After viewing the data
on the computer, the officers then seized the computer. The officers then adv ised that
thev took the computer from the home and search the contents within said computer. The
officer advised that such was done without warrant.

Memorandum
Presumptions and Burden of Proof. This search is presumptively unreasonable
since no search warrant authorized a search. State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851. 855 (Utah
1992) (citing Katzv. United States, 389 U.S. 347. 357. 88 S. Ct. 507. 514, 19 L. Ed. 2d
576 (1967)). The State must demonstrate "that the circumstances of rhe seizure constitute
an exception to the warrant requirement" to avoid exclusion of the evidence from trial.
State v. Stricklinu. 844 P.2d 979, 985 (Utah App. 1992): See also State v. Christensen.
676 P.2d 408. 41 1 (Utah 1984) ("Since the officers had no warrant, it was the burden of
the State to show that the search was lawful.").
Exigent Circumstances:
Exigent circumstances exist "onlv when the inevitable dela\ incident to obtaining
a warrant must give wav to an urgent need for immediate action." United States v.
Satterfield. 743 P.2d 827. 844 (11th Cir. 1984). Utah courts have identified several

exigent circumstances that may justif\ a warrantless search, including the immediate need
to prevent harm to the officers, destruction of evidence, or escape of the suspect. State \.
Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255. 1258 (Utah 1987): Citv of Orem \. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384. 1388
(Utah App. 1994): State \. Belgard. 840 P.2d 816. 823 (Utah App. 1992): State \. Palmer.
803 P.2d 1249. 1252 (Utah App. 1990). cert, denied. 815 P.2d241 (Utah 1991). "The
determination of exigencv is based on the totality of the circumstances." Henrie. 868 P.2d
at 1388.
Defendant asserts that the officers lack anv need warranting immediate action.
More than adequate time existed for the officers to obtain a search warrant. The) simply
needed to make application and obtain the Court's approval prior to searching the interior
of the computer. Defendant asserts that no exigent circumstances existed justifying such
an immediate search of the contents of the computer.
CONCLUSION
The officer herein conducted a search of the computer without judicial
authorization. The onlv justification for such a search would be exigent circumstance and
none existed here.
This ev idence must be suppressed.
Dated this 18lhdav ofJulv.2002.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby- certify that I hand delivered a copy of the foregoing to:

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
236 State Capitol
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111

Postage prepaid this JJ_ day of July 2002.

lifadu (%\L=.

Secretary

n 1;
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SHELDEN R CARTER (0589)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-9801
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH
UTAH COUNTY
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,
2 nd Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Suppress
vs.

PAUL SORENSON,
Crim. No. 011403460
Defendant.
—oooOooo —

On April 18, 2001, officers went to the home of the defendant. Officers
approached the defendant at his home. Officers advised asked to look at a
computer at the defendant's home. The officers then look at the computer via a
program call 'pre-search' the officers searched the computer locating what they
believed to be 40 images of child pornography. They then terminated their
search and seized the computer.

The officers then applied for a search warrant by filing an affidavit in
support of the warrant. See attachment. The affidavit was signed on April 24,
2001. Based on said affidavit Judge Eyre of the Fourth District Court signed the
search warrant on April 24, 2001. See Search Warrant.
On May 7, 2001, the officers executed the search warrant. On said date,
the Forensic Computer Lab received the computer and two floppy disks from the
officer. A bit stream image backup was made of the original hard drive. The
backup was then transferred to recordable CDs and marked as the original
backup. The backup was used to create additional bit stream image copies that
were used in the forensic examination. This same process was used on the
floppy disks.
Memorandum
The State law dealing with the issuance of search warrants is set out by the
provisions of Title 77 Chapter 23. The time for service of such warrants is limited
by statute to ten days after issuance.

77-23-205.

The provisions provides as follows:

Time for service

Officer may request assistance.

(1) The rragistrate shall .^ser: a direction in tne ^arrant
that it be served in the daytime, ^n^ess tne affidavits or oral
testimony state a reasonable ca_.se to believe a search ^s
necessary m the night to seize tne property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for otner good
reason; in which case he may insert a direction that it oe
served any tire of the day or ^ g n t . An officer may request
other persons to assist hi^ m conducting the search.

_PAG
E 6

(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from
the date of issuance. Any search warrant not executed within
this time shall be void and shall be returned to the court or
magistrate as not executed.

Defendant argues that the Court signed the warrant on April 24, 2001.
Not counting the 24th, the warrant should have been executed by May 4, 2001.
The officers executed the search warrant on May 7, 2001.
By law, the warrant was void after May 4. The warrant was stale and
void by statutory definition.

Statutorily the warrant was to be returned to the

Court or magistrate and not executed. The officers herein failed to comply with
the mandated period of the statute.
Defendant's motion to suppress should be granted.
Dated this

day of August, 2002.

Sheldon Carter
Att^rnev for the Defendant Sorenson

PAG
E
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby cet tif> that I faxed a copy of the foregoing Motion and Objection.
Attorney General on the
On this 30 th day of August. 2002.
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CRAIG L. BARLOW, 0213
PAULA J. HOUSTON. 5239
JASON P. PERRY, 8663
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK SHURTLEFF, 4666
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)538-1941
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE
TO DEFENDANTS MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

PAUL HARVEY SORENSEN,

:

Case No. 011403460 FS

:

Judge Stott

Defendant.

The State through its counsel, Paula J. Houston, Assistant Attorney General, submits this
Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant's motion should be
denied because the defendant's home computer was searched only after the defendant consented
to the search. After the computer was seized, a forensic search of the computer was done
pursuant to a search warrant. Therefore, these actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment of

the United States Constitution, nor Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 18, 2001, Detective Atack, an officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department
assigned to the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (ICAC), with several other
members of ICAC, contacted the defendant at his home. Detective Atack explained to the
defendant that he had received information that the defendant had purchased access to child
pornography on the Internet. He asked the defendant if they could look at his computer to see if
he had any child pornography on it. The defendant gave Detective Atack consent to search his
computer, and led them to the room where his computer was located. A consent search was
conducted on the defendant's computer. During this search, Detective Atack observed several
images of nude children engaged in sexual acts. The defendant was present during the search
and commented on the pictures. After finding the images, Detective Atack ended the consent
search and seized the computer for a full forensic examination. No additional search was made
of the computer until a search warrant, signed by Judge Donald Eyre, was obtained on Apnl 24,
2001, authorizing the complete search of the computer and two floppy disks. The forensic
examination revealed many image files of children engaged in sexual conduct.

I.

THE INITIAL SEARCH WAS VALID BECAUSE CONSENT WAS
VOLUNTARILY GIVEN

2

0

Searches which are authorized by consent are "wholly valid". Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). This principle has been upheld repeatedly since Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) where the United States Supreme Court stated that it is "well settled
that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." (See also Davis v. United
States. 328 U.S. 582, 593-594, Vale v. Louisiana, 26 L.Ed.2d 409, Katz at 389). In order for a
consent search to be valid, the consent must be freely and voluntanly given. See Bumber v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). This is a question of fact, and it must be determined from
the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth at 227.
In this case, Agent Rose testified at the preliminary hearing that he went to the
defendant's home with other ICAC members. The defendant opened the door. They explained
that in January 2000, ICAC received information from the Dallas Texas Police Department that
the defendant had used his credit card to purchase access to a web site that distributed child
pornography. They asked the defendant if they could look at his computer and descnbed the
search program they would use on his computer. The defendant freely and voluntanly consented
to the officers entering his home and searching his computer. He took them to the computer,
which was located in his bedroom, and watched as the officers searched his computer. The
defendant did not with draw his consent at any time dunng this search. Based on the consent
doctrine, this search did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, nor

3
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Article I, Section-14 of the Utah Constitution.

II.

SEIZURE OF THE COMPUTER WAS VALID BECAUSE OF PLAIN
VIEW AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that ,;while lawfully engaged in an activity in
a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immediately."
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983). They also stated that "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection." See Katz at 351. If an individual is invited into a home and does not exceed the
scope of the invitation, he may seize anything in plain view. State v. McArthur, 996 P.2d 555,
562 (Utah App. 2000).
During the consent search in this case, numerous images of nude children engaged in
sexual acts were found on the defendant's computer. The defendant was not under arrest nor was
he being removed from the home. The officers were in a place they had a legal right to be, based
on the consent of the defendant, conducting a search they had a legal right to conduct. Upon
seeing the images of nude children engaged in sexual acts, the officers had probable cause to
believe those pictures where illegal. They seized the computer as evidence in plain view and
based on exigent circumstances. Because computer images are easily destroyed and because it is
easy to move a personal computer, it was reasonable for the officers to believe the defendant
would destroy or hide the evidence if they did not seize the computer immediately. Citvof Orem
4
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v Henne, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Belgard. 840 P.2d 819 (Utah App 1992);
State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). The
seizure of the computer did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
nor Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

III.

THE FORENSIC SEARCH WAS V \LID BECAUSE IT WAS PURSUANT
TO A SEARCH WARRANT

Once the computer was seized, a search warrant was obtained before any additional
searches were conducted on the computer. The warrant was signed by Judge Donald Eyre on
April 24, 2001, authorizing the complete search of the computer and two floppy disks which
were seized from the defendant. A copy of the search warrant was sent to the defense as part of
discovery. (See, Search Warrant, bate stamp 00000002-0000000.)

CONCLUSION
As the court noted in Schneckloth "in some situations where the police have some
evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a
valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence." (Schneckloth
at 288). Such is the case at hand, ICAC received information that the defendant's credit card
was used to purchased access to an Internet website that distnbuted child pornography and went
to the defendant's home to investigate that information. In the process, the defendant
5

consented to let the officers search his computer for such matenal. The defendant's consent was
voluntary and the evidence that was obtained from that consent should be admitted at tnal. The
subsequent forensic search was conducted under a duly authonzed search warrant and all
evidence obtained as a result of that search should also be admitted at tnal.

DATED this 16th day of August, 2002.

MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General /

v

m

Paula J. Hoi/ston
Assistant Attorney General
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on this
day of August, 2002, I mailed a true and correct copv
of the above Memorandum in Response to Defendants Motion to Suppress, postage pre-paid, to
Shelden Carter at 3325 North University, Suite 200, Provo, UtaK84604-4438.

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
No.
To any peace officer in the State of Utah:
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Detective Ryan
Atack, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that on the premises known
as:
Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Office, 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake
City, UT, 84111.
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain
property or evidence described as:
A personal computer, known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number
N160095844+.
Two floppy disks, known as Diane's 1.2MB and Diane's 720KB.
And that said property, which was seized by the Internet Crimes Against Children Task
Force, was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has been used to commit
or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
You are therefore commanded in the daytime, to make a search of the above described
items for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same or

any part thereof, to bring it before me at the Fourth District Court, County of Utah,
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court.

t
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 2i
'/>f _ day of April, 2001.
Judge
Fourth District Court

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
I, Detective Ryan Atack, under oath state:
1.
I am a Detective with the Salt Lake City police department. I have been a police
officer for 9 years and am currently assigned to the Utah Internet Crimes Against Children
Task Force. My current assignment is that of investigating the sexual exploitation of children
by means of the Internet. I have attended the Fox Valley Technical College protecting children
on-line course. I have also attended the Western States Vice Conference, the National
Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics On-line Investigation course, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation Innocent Images course. I have investigated several cases involving
the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet.
2. This affidavit is made in support of an application for a warrant to search a computer
which I have seized from Paul Sorensen. The computer is a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial
number N160095844+-. I seized the computer on April 18, 2001 and it is being stored at the Utah
Internet Crimes against Children Task Force Office located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111. This affidavit has been reviewed by Jason P. Perry, Assistant Utah Attorney
General.
3. In January of 2000, I received information from the Dallas Texas Police
Department that Paul Sorensen of 234 South 800 West, Orem, UT 84058, had purchased
access to a web site that distributed child pornography with one of his credit cards.
4.
On April 18, 2001, myself and other members of the Utah Internet Crimes
Against Children Task Force contacted Paul Sorensen at his residence. We identified
ourselves to Mr. Sorensen and explained to him that we had received information that he had
purchased access to child pornography on the Internet. I informed him that he was not under
arrest. I asked Mr. Sorensen if we could look at his computer to see if he had any child

pornography stored on it. Mr. Sorensen said "sure, no problem" and led us to the computer.
Using a program called "Pre-search" we conducted a consent search of Mr. Sorensen's
computer. During the search I saw approximately 40 images of naked children that I believed
to be under the age of 12 in various poses exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual
activity. After viewing these images I terminated the consent search of Mr. Sorensen's
computer. During this consent search, Mr. Sorensen stated that the pictures we viewed on his
computer " seem familiar to ones he's seen over the years". I seized the computer so that a full
forensic examination of it could be preformed.
6. On the basis of the information contained in this affidavit, I believe there is probable
cause to believe that Paul Sorensen may be a collector of child pornography and that there will
be additional evidence of this crime stored on his computer that was seized. Accordingly, it is
requested that following items be searched which are located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111:
A personal computer known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number
N160095844+.
Two Floppy disks know as Diane's 1.2 MB and Diane's 720 KB

Detective Ryan Atack
Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

1

/Ji

day of April, 2001.

Fourth District Court

,>

tfUurtiCcunty.Sis::-

CRAIG L. BARLOW, 0213
PAULA J. HOUSTON. 5239
JASON P. PERRY, 8663
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK SHURTLEFF, 4666
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)538-1941
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE
TO DEFENDANTS 2nd MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

PAUL HARVEY SORENSEN,

:

Case No. 011403460 FS

:

Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendant.

The State through its attorney, Paula J. Houston, Assistant Attorney General, submits this
Memorandum in Response to Defendant's 2nd Motion to Suppress. Defendant's motion should
be denied because the search warrant was "served" immediately upon receipt even though the lab
did not receive the computer until nine days after the issuance of the search warrant pursuant to
the procedures for computing time as outlined in Rule 2 of the Criminal Rules of Procedure.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 18, 2001, Detective Atack, an officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department
assigned to the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (ICAC), with several other
members of ICAC, contacted the defendant at his home, entered the home with consent of the
defendant, searched his computer, and then seized it when sexually explicit images of children
were found on the computer. At no time did the defendant withdraw his consent. Detective
Atack obtained a search warrant on April 24, 2001 which authorized a search of the computer
and two disks. The computer and the disks were transported to the lab May 7, 2001, thirteen
calendar days after the warrant was issued. Four of those days were weekend days.
I. CONSENT
At stated in the first memorandum, searches which are authorized by consent are "wholly
valid." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) This principle has been upheld repeatedly
since Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) where the United States Supreme
Court stated that it is "well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the
requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to
consent." A consent search must be freely and voluntanly given. See Bumber v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). The person giving their consent has a nght to withdraw their consent
at anytime. As of this date, the defendant has not withdrawn his consent to his computer and
disks being searched. Based on the consent doctnne, the forensic search did not violate the

?

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, nor Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.
II. TIME FOR SERVICE OF A SEARCH WARRANT
Section 77-23-205(2) states a ''search warrant shall be served within ten days from the
date of issuance." The defendant argues that the w arrant was executed on May 7, 2001. In
addition, the defendant says it should have been served no later than May 4, 2001 and was void
after that date, this argument raises two issues: when is a warrant "served" and how do you
compute the time for serving a search warrant.
1.

WHEN IS A WARRANT "SERVED?"

Typically a warrant is "served" when it is handed to the home owner as the officer
explains their nght to enter the home and search it or when the officers force entry into the home.
Service is not as clear when the officers have the object to be searched in their possession. In the
case at issue, the officers obtained a search warrant for the defendant's computer and disks which
they already had in their possession. They considered the warrant "served" on themselves when
they returned to the office because they were the individuals "in whose possession it was found/'
Section 77-23-206. The computer and disks were transported to the lab for analysis on May 7,
2001. Nothing in Section 77-23-205 requires the search itself to be completed within any certain
time period. Forensic searches at the lab often take days and even months depending on the case
load at the time the search is requested.

3

2.

HOW DO YOU COMPUTE THE TIME FOR SERVING A SEARCH
WARRANT?

If the court decides that the warrant was ^served" on May 7, 2001, the date it was given to
the lab, then the question is how do you compute the time for serving a search warrant Section
77-1-2 states 'The procedure in cnminal cases shall be as prescnbed in this title, the Rules of
Cnminal Procedures, and such further rules as may be adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah "
So, in addition to Section 77-23-205, the court must consider the Rules of Cnminal Procedure
because Rule 2 specifically sets out the procedure for computing penods of time. Cr P. Rule 2
says that if the time penod is less than 11 days, Saturdays, Sundays, and legal hohdavs are not
counted. Because the time set out in Section 77-23-205 is 10 days, Cr. P. Rule 2 requires
Saturdays and Sundays to be excluded from the penod. Using the dates argued by the defendant,
Apnl 24, 2001 to May 7, 2001, two Saturdays and two Sundays occur. When those days are
subtracted from the time penod, the warrant was served nine days after it was issued. Therefore,
it was valid on the date it was served making the search a legally authonzed search.
EXTENSION OF TIME
Cr. P. Rule 2 allows the court for cause shown, at any time in its discretion, including
after the expiration of the specified penod, to "permit the act to be done if there was a reasonable
excuse for the failure to act." The State hereby moves the court to extend the time penod for the
search warrant to allow the search that was conducted in May 2001. The officers acted in
good faith in administenng this warrant. The evidence which was the basis for the probable
4
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cause was not becoming stale The evidence was in a protected environment and was not going to
change no matter how long it took for the search The defendant was not harmed or
inconvenienced as a result of search If the officers violated the ten-day rule, it was a technical
violation that did not violate the spirit of the law
CONCLUSION
The forensic search was conducted under consent and a duly authorized search warrant
and all evidence obtained as a result of that search should be admitted at trial If there was a
violation of the ten-day rule, it was not a substantial violation pursuant to Section 77-23-212 and
therefore the motion to suppress should be denied.

s-W,

DATED t h i s - ^ ^ d a v of September, 2002

MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

Paula J Houston
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, and faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 2nd MOTION TO SUPPRESS to:

SHELDON CARTER
HARRIS & CARTER
3325 N University Ave, STE 200
Provo, UT 84604
(801)377-1149 (Fax)
DATED this <r^

day of
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, 2002.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING Re: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Plaintiff,
Case No 011403460

vs
Honorable Fred D Howard
District Court Judge

PAUL SORENSEN,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter having come before the court on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress, and the court having reviewed the Motion and Plaintiffs Response thereto, the court
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, it now makes the following ruling

RULING
The matter before the Court arises from Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence On
April 18, 2001, Detective Atack, an officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department assigned to
the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (ICAC), with other members of ICAC,
contacted Defendant at his home. Detective Atack explained to Defendant that ICAC had
received information that Defendant had purchased access to child pornography on the Internet
After this initial contact with him, Defendant was asked if the detectives might look at his

1

computer regarding evidence of child pornography Defendant consented to the request and led
the investigators to the bedroom where the computer was located

The detectives searched then

seized the computer
On July 19, 2002, Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress Plaintiff filed it's Response on
August 16, 2002 Defendant asserts that Detective Atack and other officers unreasonably
searched and seized his computer for evidence of child pornography, and, therefore, the evidence
should be suppressed Plaintiff asserts that the detectives advised Defendant of the information
they had received regarding possible child pornography, and that they asked for and received
permission to look at his computer, and as such, the search was a consensual search that does not
violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution The Court is persuaded by
Plaintiffs pleading and authonties regarding consensual searches and that such a search is valid if
the consent was freely and voluntarily given After review of the parties' pleadings and
authorities the Court concludes that Defendant freely and voluntarily gave his permission for the
officers to search his computer Further, no evidence has been established of record to show that
Defendant later withdrew his consent to render a continued search invalid
Defendant also asserts that seizure of the computer was invalid because the search of the
computer was done illegally Having determined that the search conducted by the detectives on
Defendant's computer was reasonable and valid, the officers' subsequent seizure of the computer
was legal when they thereafter were able to view images which ostensibly would be characterized

2

as child pornography. The seizure was also justified since the Defendant might destroy or conceal
the computer data evidence on the computer while the officers sought a search warrant.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the search warrant obtained on April 24, 2001, was properly
served on the possessors of the property to be searched. U.C.A. § 77-23-205(2) regarding search
warrant service states, "a search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of
issuance." Defendant asserts that the warrant was executed on May 7, 2001, however, it should
have been served no later than May 4, 2001, or it became void. The Court is not persuaded by
Defendant's argument. The Court notes that service and execution of the warrant are separate
issues that are often mistaken as one in the same because usually the warrant is served and
executed simultaneously. The officers seized the computer on April 18, 2001, taking it into their
custody but the warrant was not obtained by the officers until April 24, 2001. The warrant was
essentially served on May 24, 2001 at the time the officers obtained the warrant because the
property covered by the warrant was in their possession. Therefore, the warrant was served on
April 24, 2001 and not executed until May 7, 2001 when the computer and disks were delivered
to the forensic lab for search. After review of the statutory authorities the Court finds that there
is no requirement in U.C.A. § 77-23-205 that requires the authorities who are executing the
search upon the property to conduct such search within a specific time period. The Court
concludes that the subsequent forensic search conducted upon the computer following it's seizure
was a valid search authorized by warrant obtained on April 24, 2001.

3

For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress
DATED this ^ /

day of September, 2002

I'*VE'J

BY THE COURT ^ >>S£&$/
,'?

a: 3
Honorable Fred D K c r \ ^ ^*^%
^TI^/ s
District Court Judge ' . ^ "*"* ^ V
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of tt»e foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, on this -*-f day of September 2002'
Sheldon R. Carter
HARRIS & CARTER
3325 N University Ave., Suite 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Building
Provo, Utah 84604
Craig Barlow
Paula Houston
Jason Perry
ksastasa. kstovas^s CtewereA.
Mark ShurtlerT
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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SHELDEN R. CARTER (0589)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
3325 North University Avenue
Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604-4438
Telephone: 375-9801

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPT.
—ooOoo—
STATE OF UTAH,

OBJECTION TO FINDING
OF FACT REFERENCING
SEARCH BY CONSENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

PAUL SORENSON,
Defendant.

Case No: 011403460 fs
Honorable: Howard
—ooOoo—

Defendant objects to any findings suggesting the State had the defendant's
consent to search his computer or property. The facts in support of the motion to
suppress were contained within the "Stipulated Facts referencing Motion to
Suppress."
No facts were presented to the Court regarding the issue of consent. See
attachment detailing all the facts relevant to the Motion to Suppress.

DATED this 17™ day of March, 2003

SHELDEN R CARTER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct copv of
the foregoing on this

• ' day of March, 2003, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage

prepaid to the following:
Paula Houston
Attorney General for the State of Utah
236 State Capital
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84126-0295
Secretary

SHELDEN R CARTER (0589)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-9801
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH
UTAH COUNTY
-oooOoooSTATE OF UTAH,

vs.

PAUL SORENSON,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

Stipulated Facts Referencing
Motion to Suppress

)
)
)

Crim. No. 011403460

--000O000 —

On April 18, 2001, officers went to the home of the defendant. Officers
approached the defendant at his home. Officers advised asked to look at a
computer at the defendant's home. The officers then look at the computer via a
program call 'pre-search' the officers searched the computer locating what they
believed to be 40 images of child pornography. They then terminated their
search and seized the computer.

The officers then applied for a search warrant by filing an affidavit in
support of the warrant. See attachment. The affidavit was signed on April 24,
2001. Based on said affidavit, Judge Eyre of the Fourth District Court signed the
search warrant on April 24, 2001. See Search Warrant.
On May 7, 2001, the officers executed the search warrant. On said date,
the Forensic Computer Lab received the computer and two floppy disks from the
officer. A bit stream image backup was made of the original hard drive. The
backup was then transferred to recordable CDs and marked as the original
backup. The backup was used to create additional bit stream image copies that
were used in the forensic examination. This same process was used on the
floppy disks.
Dated this

day of August, 2002.

Paula Houston
For the Attorney General for the State of Utah
Dated this

day of August, 2002.

Shelden Carter
Attorney for the Defendant Sorenson
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MAILIMG CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally faxed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing on this

day of August, 2002, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage

prepaid to the following:
Hand delivered this day to the Attorney General

Fourth Judicial District Court
District Court
Provo, Utah
Secretary
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SEARCH YVARRANT
No.
To any peace officer in the State of Utah:
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Detective Ryan
Atack, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that on the premises known
as:
Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Office, 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake
City, UT, 84111.
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain
property or evidence described as:
A personal computer, known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number
N160095844+.
Two floppy disks, known as Diane's 1.2MB and Diane's 720KB.
And that said property, which was seized by the Internet Crimes Against Children Task
Force, was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has been used to commit
or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
You are therefore commanded in the daytime, to make a search of the above described
items for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same or

any part thereof, to bring it before me at the Fourth District Court, County of Utah,
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

if-

2i

day of April, 2001.

Judge
Fourth District Court

QOOVVdO'J
_L I O

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
I, Detective Ryan Atack, under oath state:
1.
I am a Detective with the Salt Lake City police department. I have been a police
officer for 9 years and am currently assigned to the Utah Internet Crimes Against Children
Task Force. My current assignment is that of investigating the sexual exploitation of children
by means of the Internet. I have attended the Fox Valley Technical College protecting children
on-line course. I have also attended the Western States Vice Conference, the National
Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics On-line Investigation course, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation Innocent Images course. I have investigated several cases involving
the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet.
2
This affidavit is made in support of an application for a warrant to search a computer
which I have seized from Paul Sorensen. The computer is a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial
number N160095844+-. I seized the computer on April 18, 2001 and it is being stored at the Utah
Internet Crimes against Children Task Force Office located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 8411 i. This affidavit has been reviewed by Jason P. Perry, Assistant Utah Attorney
General.
3. In January of 2000, I received information from the Dallas Texas Police
Department that Paul Sorensen of 234 South 800 West, Orem, UT 84058, had purchased
access to a web site that distributed child pornography with one of his credit cards.
4.
On April 18, 2001, myself and other members of the Utah Internet Crimes
Against Children Task Force contacted Paul Sorensen at his residence. We identified
ourselves to Mr. Sorensen and explained to him that we had received information that he had
purchased access to child pornography on the Internet. I informed him that he was not under
arrest. I asked Mr. Sorensen if we could look at his computer to see if he had any child

pornography stored on it Mr Sorensen said "sure, no problem" and led us to the computer
Using a program called "Pre-search" we conducted a consent search of Mr Sorensen's
computer During the search I saw approximately 40 images of naked children that I believed
to be under the age of 12 in various poses exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual
activity After viewing these images I terminated the consent search of Mr Sorensen's
computer During this consent search, Mr Sorensen stated that the pictures we viewed on his
computer " seem familiar to ones he's seen over the years" I seized the computer so that a full
forensic examination of it could be preformed
6
On the basis of the information contained in this affidavit, I believe there is probable
cause to believe that Paul Sorensen may be a collector of child pornography and that there will
be additional evidence of this crime stored on his computer that was seized Accordingly, it i*
requested that following items be searched which are located at 257 East 200 South, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111
A personal computer known as a Packard Bell Legend 2440, serial number
N160095844+
Two Floppy disks know as Diane's 1 2 MB and Diane's 720 KB

Detective Ryar
Ryan Atack
Utah Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

/J-f

day of April, 2001

Juc
Fourth District Court

OOOOOPfi

- *' I
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SHELDEN R CARTER (0589)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
3325 North University, Suite 200
Provo. Utah 84604-4438
Telephone: 375-9801
IN THE FOURTH JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH. UTAH COUNTY
—ooOoo—
MOTION TO STRIKE
COURT FINDINGS
STATE OF UTAH,
NOT SUBSTANTIATED
Plaintiff,
BY STIPULATION RE:
FACTS
vs.
CASE NO. 011403460
PAUL HARVEY SORENSEN.
Defendant.
—ooOoo—

Defendant herein sought to suppress evidence. Defendant asserts that officers
herein took, confiscated and search his propertv. The defendant asserts that such conduct
is a violation of the rights guaranteed to him under Art. I Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The parties herein stipulated to the facts upon which the Court would rely on the
motion to suppress. The stipulation was signed bv counsel for both parties and approved
by this Court.
The Court's ruling went beyond the facts represented in the stipulation. The
onlv factual basis for the Court" ruling (re: motion to suppress) would be within the

parties' stipulation. No other hearings were conducted regarding the motion to suppress
and no other evidence exists..
Based thereon, the defendant motions to limit the factual findings (set out in the
Court's ruling denying the motion to suppress) to those facts contained within the
parties' stipulation.
Dated this 2nd day of April 2003.

/^~^\

Shekfen Carter X
Attorney for Defendant Sorensen

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereb> certify that I hand delivered a cop> of the foregoing to:

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
236 State Capitol
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

Postage prepaid this £__ day of April 2003.

Secretary
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
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''^-Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING RE: DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO STRIKE COURT
FINDINGS NOT SUBSTANTIATED
BY STIPULATION RE: FACTS
Case #011403460

PAUL HARVEY SORENSEN,
Defendant.

Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 2

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Strike
Court Findings Not Substantiated by Stipulation Re: Facts; and the Court having considered the
Motion and Plaintiffs Response thereto; the Court being fully advised in the premises, and good
cause appearing, it now makes the following ruling:
RULING
The matter before the Court arises from Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence and the
Court's previous ruling on the Motion.

The Court notes that the parties' Stipulated Facts

Referencing the Motion to Suppress contains the following language:

"On April 18, 2001, officers went to the home of the defendant.
Officers approached the defendant at this home. Officers advised
asked to look at a computer at the defendant's home. The officers
then look at the computer via a program call 'pre-search' the officers
searched the computer locating what they believed to be 40 images of
child pornography. They then terminated their search and seized the
computer.

"The officers then applied for a search warrant by filing an affidavit
in support of the warrant. See attachment. The affidavit was
signed on April 24, 2001. Based on said affidavit, Judge Eyre of the
Fourth District Court signed the search warrant on April 24,2001.
See Search Warrant.
"On May 7, 2001, the officers executed the search warrant. On said
date, the Forensic Computer Lab received the computer and two
floppy disks from the officer. A bit stream image backup was made
of the original hard drive. The backup was then transferred to
recordable CDs and marked as the original backup. The backup was
used to create additional bit stream image copies that were used in the
forensic examination. This same process was used on the floppy
disks." (Emphasis added)

By use of the above language, as drafted by Defendant's counsel, the parties "incorporated"
the facts also contained within the attachments as well: i.e., the Search Warrant and the Affidav it for
Search Warrant, as opposed to the mere reference to the fact that a search warrant was issued which
required no such document reference or incorporation. Notably, the Affidavit for Search Warrant
contains the following language:

"On April 18, 2001, myself and other members of the Utah Internet
Crimes Against Children Task Force contacted Paul Sorensen at his
residence. We identified ourselves to Mr. Sorensen and explained to
him that we had received information that he had purchased access to
child pornography on the Internet. I informed him that he was not
under arrest. I asked Mr. Sorensen if we could look at his
computer to see if he had any child pornography stored on it.
Mr. Sorensen said 4sure, no problem' and led us to the computer.
Using a program called Tre-search' we conducted a consent search
2

of Mr Sorensen's computer During the search I saw approximately
40 images of naked children that I believed to be under the age of 12
in various poses exposing their genitalia and engaged in sexual
activ lty After viewing theses images I terminated the consent search
of Mr Sorensen's computer During this consent search, Mr
Sorensen stated that the pictures we viewed on his computer * seemed
familiar to ones he's seen over the years ' I seized the computer so
that a full forensic examination of it could be preformed "' (Emphasis
added)

These are the facts known and claimed by the parties at the time the stipulation was made
relative to the Motion to Suppress It is the Court's opinion as set forth in its previous Ruling that
notwithstanding Defendant's assertions to the contrary, such factual occurrence and the circumstances of this case support the conclusion that the search was a consensual search For these reasons
and by reason of the authorities and arguments set forth in Plaintiffs memoranda, Defendant *
Motion is respectfully denied

Dated this 14 ffday of April 2003

FRED/) HOWARD
hstnct Coupt Judge

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify' that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the
2003 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:
Paul G. Amann
Craig L. Barlow
Assistant Attorneys General
by hand
Shelden R. Carter
Attorney for Defendant
by hand

Deputy Court Clerk
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